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THE REVOLUTION ENTERS THE COURT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL
REGULATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Jordan Steiker * †
Over the last decade, the most important events in American death penalty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous
wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most
substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late
1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republican, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually
commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003.
The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state
legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing
reach of the death penalty to studying its operation and limiting its reach.
Unlike the issues of racial and economic disparities, the issue of wrongful
convictions has had real public and political traction. Of course, the prospect
of executing innocents has always lurked as a potential concern for the death
penalty, but the apparent breadth of the problem in Illinois, coupled with the
increased sophistication of DNA testing as a potential means of identifying
innocents, pushed the issue to the social and political fore.
The emerging question in the legal world is whether the concern about
wrongful convictions has any jurisprudential significance. Over a decade
ago, in Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court was not particularly welcoming of the claim that the Constitution forbids the execution of innocents.
Several justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, insisted that post-conviction
proof of innocence did not establish a cognizable claim on federal habeas
and that executive clemency has been and should remain the safety valve for
convictions undermined by new evidence. Although the defendant lost that
case, a majority of justices suggested that some post-conviction judicial forum must be available in capital cases where a death-sentenced inmate
makes a “truly persuasive” showing of actual innocence.
But how else is the prospect of wrongful convictions significant to death
penalty law? So far, the courts have said very little. Most of the action is in
state legislatures, which have considered (and in some cases adopted) new
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protections in capital cases designed to prevent wrongful convictions, including alteration of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to a “beyond
any doubt” standard, increased funding for capital defense lawyers, and
greater access to DNA testing in capital cases.
Enter the Supreme Court’s decision last term in Kansas v. Marsh. At
first glance the case appears relatively mundane. Kansas’s death penalty
statute requires imposition of death if the jury finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that the “aggravating circumstances [are] not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.” The defendant argued, and managed to persuade the
Kansas Supreme Court, that the Constitution forbids requiring the death
penalty in cases of “equipoise,” where aggravating and mitigating circumstances are evenly balanced. From a doctrinal standpoint, the Kansas
Supreme Court’s decision was a bit of a stretch, because the United States
Supreme Court had already sustained Pennsylvania and Arizona provisions
that likewise appeared to require jurors to impose death without independently requiring jurors to determine that death was the appropriate
punishment.
That the Supreme Court granted certiorari is somewhat of a puzzle.
Kansas isn’t exactly a death penalty powerhouse (with a death row of eight
and no executions in over 40 years, dating back to the era of the murders
detailed in Truman Capote’s “In Cold Blood”), and there are few cases in
which the Supreme Court has reversed a state high court decision finding
federal constitutional error within a state death penalty scheme. Indeed, Justices Stevens and Scalia engage in a lengthy colloquy with Justice Stevens
asserting that no substantial federal interest justifies reviewing state court
over-enforcement of federal rights and Justice Scalia maintaining that the
Kansas Supreme Court deprived the people of Kansas of their legitimate
desire to implement the death penalty through their chosen approach.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Thomas, seems to miss the
boat. The defendant’s complaint was that the statute was “mandatory,” and
the majority concluded that the Court’s decisions rejecting the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty did not apply, because the jurors in Kansas
were allowed to consider fully and give adequate effect to mitigating evidence. But the real objection is that the statute is mandatory in a different
sense. The equipoise provision “mandates” that ties go to the State in capital
sentencing and that jurors must deliver death verdicts when aggravating and
mitigating considerations are of equal strength. This sort of “mandatory”
provision dictates a rule of decision (not necessarily a rule of exclusion with
respect to mitigating evidence), and such a rule of decision runs counter to
the Court’s overall effort to ensure that state schemes reliably sort out the
worst-of-the-worst offenders.
Death sentences remain a notable exception, even for death-eligible offenses. The number of capital sentences has dropped precipitously over the
past decade, from a national average of over 300 per year in the mid-1990s
to an average of less than 150 per year in 2003–04, the most recent two
years for which data is available. The Court’s constitutional regulatory enterprise regarding the death penalty has always been motivated by the vast
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divide between death-eligibility under state law and states’ actual implementation of the death penalty. Given this animating concern and the recent
exacerbation of this divide, it seems very odd (if not unconstitutional) for
states to permit imposition of the death penalty in what are, by definition,
“close” cases. Given that states have accomplished little in terms of narrowing the reach of the death penalty via statutory definition (most states have
been promiscuous in their enumeration of aggravating factors), they should
at least require jurors to conclude that the circumstances of the offense and
the offender overwhelmingly justify the imposition of the death penalty. At a
minimum, capital instructions should directly ask jurors whether the death
penalty is appropriate in light of all aggravating and mitigating factors. The
problem with the Kansas statute is that it does neither, and permits—in fact
requires—jurors to choose death when mitigation and aggravation are in
balance.
But the majority opinion is of little interest or significance. Even a decision favoring the Respondent would have resulted in a slight alteration of
the statute so that aggravation would have to outweigh mitigation instead of
allowing ties to go to the State. The real action and the true significance can
be found in Justice Souter’s dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Justice
Souter’s dissent concludes with something of a Brandeis brief. He argues
that “a new body of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in practical
terms, the Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate,” and the new body
of “fact” to which he refers is the discovery of wrongfully convicted deathsentenced inmates. His dissent discusses the experience in Illinois, exalts the
role of DNA in uncovering innocents on death row, and cites statistics about
the number of “exonerated” inmates in recent years. Justice Souter concludes by saying that we are in a “period of new empirical argument about
how ‘death is different’” and he seems to suggest that death penalty doctrine
should take account of the “cautionary lesson of recent experience” with
wrongful convictions. Although he disclaims any interest in revisiting the
constitutionality of the death penalty as a whole (“it is far too soon for any
generalization about the soundness of capital sentencing across the country”), he suggests that we should be chastened by recent experience and
reject state death penalty rules, such as the one in Kansas, that might generate additional error in our capital punishment systems.
Justice Souter’s dissent is remarkable. It is joined by three other Justices
and it seems to travel the same path, though not as far, as Justice Blackmun’s dissent from denial of certiorari more than a decade earlier, in
Callins v. Collins, declaring that he will no longer tinker with the machinery
of death. Instead of adopting Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall’s more
general claim that the death penalty is inconsistent with prevailing standards
of decency and serves no justifiable penological goal, Justice Souter and his
fellow dissenters seem to be setting up the possibility that the death penalty’s implementation is flawed in a way that might constitutionally compel
courts to cabin its reach. In many respects, this dissent carries forward the
same theme of Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Ring v. Arizona. In
that opinion, Justice Breyer defended the essential role of juries in capital
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decisionmaking by detailing the many emerging failures of the American
death penalty system. In his view, the jury sentencing right in capital cases
emerges not from any general Sixth Amendment interest in juror decisionmaking, but because doubts about the death penalty’s deterrence value, as
well as concerns about its arbitrary, discriminatory, and wrongful imposition, require states to preserve the link between the community (via jurors)
and death sentences.
Justice Scalia, who had mildly and light-heartedly chastised Justice
Breyer in Ring for joining the Court’s judgment despite his opposition to
Apprendi v. New Jersey (suggesting that Justice Breyer “buy a ticket to Apprendi-land”), reacts much more vehemently and acerbically to this dissent.
First, Justice Scalia, relying on the work of others, challenges the empirical
claim about the extensiveness of error in capital cases. According to Justice
Scalia, the number of “true” exonerations (for “innocent” defendants, as
opposed to those later deemed “not guilty,” or freed by legal error) is much
smaller than Justice Souter’s sources claim. Second, Justice Scalia views the
exoneration of many innocents before execution, coupled with the absence
of any demonstrable wrongful execution in the modern era, as indicative of
the health rather than the pathology of the current system.
But Justice Scalia’s broader concern is that he regards Justice Souter and
his fellow dissenters as grandstanding for an international stage. Justice
Scalia takes a direct swipe at international opponents of the American death
penalty, accusing them of “sanctimonious criticism” because “most of the
countries to which these finger-waggers belong had the death penalty themselves until recently—and indeed, many of them would still have it if the
democratic will prevailed.” Justice Scalia’s reaction seems peculiar given
that the dissent makes no mention of world opinion or practice. But on the
heels of Roper v. Simmons’s rejection of the death penalty for juveniles, in
part based on overwhelming international condemnation of the practice,
Justice Scalia apparently views the dissenters’ criticisms of the operation of
state death penalty schemes as essentially designed “to impugn” the American death penalty “before the world.” This is a new angle, and readers of
Justice Scalia’s opinion might be surprised to find that his comments are a
response to a dissent in the U.S. Reports rather than to a speech delivered to
the European Union.
His fear of foreign influence aside, Justice Scalia rightly appreciates the
significance of Justice Souter’s opinion. Like Justice Blackmun’s and Justice Breyer’s preceding global attacks on the death penalty, this opinion
seems to contain a gratuitous assault on the death penalty—gratuitous because of its generality and seeming unrelatedness to the doctrinal issues
presented (Justice Scalia accuses the dissent of nailing its complaint to the
door of the wrong church because this case involved a challenge to sentencing instructions and not to the guilt-innocence determination). Even Justice
Souter’s comment that “it is far too soon” to consider the general soundness
of American capital punishment, seems self-consciously aimed to raise the
possibility of some future global empirical attack on the actual operation of
the American death penalty system. When the Court chose to review the
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Kansas Supreme Court decision, no one would have remotely thought that
this technical case about Kansas’s statute would call into question the overall operation of the American death penalty system, and yet the four
dissenters seem determined to at least raise the prospect.
Justice Scalia’s contempt and anger thus stem from his (perhaps justifiable) belief that the dissenters are lying in wait for the opportunity to attack
the death penalty as a whole, and his view that the dissenters are motivated
or supported by international elites. Whatever the truth of the international
connection (it was after all, Justice Kennedy—who votes with the majority
in this case—who enthusiastically embraced international opinion in his
opinion invalidating the death penalty for juveniles), the real prospect for
wrongful convictions affecting death penalty jurisprudence will be whether
the fear of executing innocents shifts public opinion at home. Both Justice
Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions are clearly attempting to inform this
debate by appealing to the facts on the ground (none of which could be
found in the parties’ briefs), and perhaps portend the movement toward a
new era of empirically-informed death penalty jurisprudence.

